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The paper tries to identify some key principles that distinguish cosmopolitanism from other 
approaches in terms of individual responsibility in international affairs. Many of these 
principles, and notably the idea that a political community is not responsible for the 
wrongdoings of its rulers, have been absorbed by international law and practice. Since the end 
of WWII these principles have been codified in important documents, such as the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the Nuremberg Principles. With the end of the Cold War, a 
further crucial development has emerged and the international community has started to be 
more active in carrying out, through a variety of national and international courts, investigations 
against egregious criminals. 
But we are still far from proper cosmopolitan criminal accountability. International hearings 
have put at the bar the weak rather than the strong players of world politics. This confirms the 
realist prediction that the legal infrastructure is likely to reinforce the actual distribution of 
power rather than to counter-balance it. Moreover, the disproportion between the scale of 
international crimes on the one hand and the amount of individuals at the bar on the other hand 
undermines the legitimacy of individual criminal justice. 
The paper explores possible evolution of to the current judicial system for international crimes 
following basic cosmopolitan principles. 1) The International Criminal Court should fully 
implement its mandate and thus also be able to cover the crime that it is more likely to be 
committed by strong world political players, that is, aggression. 2) The noble tradition of 
opinion tribunals, inaugurated by Bertrand Russell, Jean-Paul Sartre and Lelio Basso with the 
Tribunal for war crimes in Vietnam, should become a core aspect of a cosmopolitan criminal 
justice system since it is more likely to target the powerful and the winners rather than the 
powerless and the losers. Even if opinion tribunals are not in the position to inflict punishment, 
they can vindicate the reasons of the weak players. 3) While the cosmopolitan idea that key 
culprits should be held criminally responsible still holds, there is the risking of exonerating 
collective responsibility through a few scapegoats. Some fresh forms of addressing major 
crimes also through collective awareness need to be explored. 4) Finally, the potential of truth 
and reconciliation commissions, on the model pioneered by South Africa, should be further 
developed as a method to integrate individual criminal responsibility. 
Keywords:  International  law, cosmopolitan  law,  International Criminal Court, Ad‐Hoc 
International Criminal Tribunals, Nuremberg Principles, Universal Jurisdiction 
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Questo paper tenta di identificare alcuni princìpi fondamentali che contraddistinguono il 
cosmopolitismo da altri approcci, in termini di responsabilità individuali negli affari 
internazionali. Molti di questi princìpi, in particolare l’idea che una comunità politica non sia 
responsabile per le malefatte dei suoi governanti, sono stati assorbiti dalla legge e dalla prassi 
internazionale. Dalla fine della seconda guerra mondiale questi princìpi sono stati codificati in 
documenti importanti, come la Dichiarazione Universale dei Diritti Umani e i Princìpi di 
Norimberga. Con la fine della Guerra fredda, è emerso un ulteriore cruciale sviluppo e la 
comunità internazionale ha cominciato a portare a termine, attraverso una varietà di tribunali 
nazionali e internazionali, indagini contro atroci criminali. 
Ma siamo ancora lontani da una corretta responsabilità penale cosmopolita. Le udienze 
internazionali hanno messo alla sbarra gli attori deboli, piuttosto che quelli forti, della politica 
mondiale. Ciò conferma la previsione realista che l’infrastruttura legale può rafforzare 
l’effettiva distribuzione del potere, piuttosto che controbilanciarla. Inoltre la sproporzione tra la 
portata di crimini internazionali, da un lato, e il numero di individui messi alla sbarra, dall’altro, 
mina la legittimità della giustizia penale individuale. 
Il paper esplora la possibile evoluzione dell’attuale sistema giudiziario internazionale seguendo 
i princìpi di base del cosmopolitismo. 1) La Corte Penale Internazionale dovrebbe dare piena 
attuazione al proprio mandato e quindi essere in grado di coprire il crimine di aggressione che è 
quello che più spesso viene commesso dagli attori più forti  della politica mondiale. 2) La nobile 
tradizione dei tribunali di opinione, inaugurata da Bertrand Russel, Jean-Paul Sartre e Lelio 
Basso, con il Tribunale per i crimini di guerra in Vietnam, dovrebbe diventare l’elemento 
centrale di un sistema di giustizia penale cosmopolitica, in quanto più adatta a colpire i potenti e 
i vincitori piuttosto che i deboli e gli sconfitti. Anche se i tribunali d’opinione non sono in grado 
di infliggere delle pene, essi possono difendere le ragioni degli attori più deboli. 3) L’idea 
cosmopolitica secondo la quale i principali responsabili dovrebbero essere penalmente 
responsabili può rischiare di esonerare la responsabilità collettiva attraverso alcuni capri 
espiatori. Alcuni modi nuovi di affrontare i crimini principali attraverso una coscienza collettiva 
dovrebbero essere esplorati. 4) Infine, il potenziale delle commissioni per la verità e la 
riconciliazione, sul modello sperimentato dal Sud Africa, dovrebbe essere ulteriormente 
sviluppato come metodo per integrare la responsabilità penale individuale. 
Parole  Chiave:  Diritto  Internazionale,  Diritto  Cosmopolitico,  Corte  Penale 
Internazionale,  Tribunali  Penali  Internazionali  Ad‐Hoc,  Princìpi  di  Norimberga, 
Giurisdizione Universale, Tribunali d’opinione 
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The emergence of a new branch of criminal and international law 
A new global criminal justice system is emerging. The hope that appeared after the end of 
WWII in Nuremberg and Tokyo but, above all, with the Nuremberg Principles approved by the 
International Law Commission in 1949, has started to become a reality. As Richard Falk 
reminded already in the 1960s, the Nuremberg Principles were a promise that lawyers and 
politicians, human rights activists and concerned citizens had to grasp. The Cold War froze 
these hopes and any attempt to develop a robust international jurisdiction has run into a dead-
end for too long. 
With the conclusion of the Cold War, new important developments have occurred: the new 
ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and, above all, the institution of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) contributed to the appearance of a new branch of criminal, 
as well as international, law1. 
For all his life, Richard Falk has been a passionate advocate and commentator of the 
projections of this emerging global criminal justice. He has consistently put his legal expertise 
at the service of his human and political values. He has: i) commented on almost all the most 
important cases of criminal jurisdiction, including those of Augusto Pinochet and Saddam 
Hussein; ii) advocated the creation of the new international criminal court; iii) participated in 
opinion tribunals on war crimes2. In this chapter, I will discuss to what extent such an emergent 
international criminal justice has contributed to achieving the cosmopolitan ideals that Richard 
Falk and others have envisaged.  
Criminal justice has always been one of the key attributes of sovereign states: states have the 
power to ascertain what a crime is, who is an offender and who is innocent, and finally to 
punish the culprits. Modernity has progressively deprived non-state institutions, such as 
religious bodies, of the competence to decide when and how individuals should be punished. 
The fact that some institutions beyond and sometimes above the state could decide on what the 
crimes are and who deserve to be punished is necessarily in conflict with supreme state 
sovereignty. The emerging global criminal justice is therefore contesting one of the key 
attributes of the sovereign state. In this sense, it is intrinsically supporting a cosmopolitan 
aspiration, namely the idea that we need to move towards forms of political organization where 
states are not the exclusive source of legitimacy. But in which ways are the legal and political 
developments of the last twenty years satisfying cosmopolitan principles? 
This chapter tries, first of all, to single out the cosmopolitan principles which should inspire 
criminal justice beyond borders. What are the cosmopolitan features of an independent judicial 
                                                            
1 For a first attempt to provide a systematization of this new branch of law, see Antonio Cassese, 
International Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
2 A sketch of the contributions provided by him to international justice can be found in the entry Henry F. 
Chip Carey, “Falk, Richard”, in Deen K. Chatterjee (ed.), Encyclopedia of Global Justice (Berlin: 
Springer, 2011). 
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power to trial suspects in supra-national institutions3? The second part makes an attempt to 
assess to what extent the current situation can satisfy the cosmopolitan viewpoint. Is the 
emerging international criminal justice fulfilling cosmopolitan aspirations? What are its 
strengths and weaknesses? The third part indicates what actions are needed to develop a global 
criminal justice system compatible with cosmopolitan ideals. 
Cosmopolitan principles 
Is it possible to identify some core cosmopolitan principles for criminal justice? 
Cosmopolitanism has become a rather important stream of political theory, developing 
considerations on duties beyond border, distributive justice, political organization and global 
ethics4. There have also been important attempts to develop a cosmopolitan legal theory, which 
could inform the reform of existing international organizations and even the creation of new 
ones5. 
The desire to make political leaders criminally accountable and the willingness to prosecute 
egregious crimes also in other communities have often been associated to cosmopolitanism. But 
the connection between the emerging global criminal justice and cosmopolitanism has not been 
fully explored. I suggest that there are at least six principles that could inspire politics beyond 
borders (see Table 1). 
1) Violations of rights in one part of the earth are felt everywhere  
More than two centuries ago, Kant made a very far sighted statement:  
“the peoples of the earth have thus entered in varying degrees into a universal community, 
and it has developed to the point where a violation of rights in one part of the world is felt 
everywhere”6. 
This is a rather forceful declaration especially if we consider the historical moment in which 
it was made. At the time, European states were affirming their sovereignty and, at the same 
time, were colonizing all other continents. The idea that violations of rights were not merely a 
                                                            
3 For a variety of perspectives, see Garrett Wallace Brown and David Held (eds.), The Cosmopolitan 
Reader (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010). See also Catherine Lu, “The One and Many Faces of 
Cosmopolitanism”, Journal of Political Philosophy, vol. 8, no. 2 (2000): 244-267; Angela Taraborrelli, 
Contemporary Cosmopolitanism (London: Bloomsbury, 2015). 
4 See Pavlos Eleftheriadis, “Cosmopolitan Law”, European Law Journal, vol. 9, no. 2 (2003): 241-263; 
Garrett Wallace Brown, “Moving from Cosmopolitan Legal Theory to Legal Practice: Models of 
Cosmopolitan Law”, Legal Studies, vol. 28, no. 3 (2008): 327-492. I myself have tried to explore the 
legal foundations of a cosmopolitan democracy in Daniele Archibugi, The Global Commonwealth of 
Citizens. Toward Cosmopolitan Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press), pp. 119-122. 
5 For a complementary exercise, see Antonio Franceschet “Four Cosmopolitan Projects: the International 
Criminal Court in Context”, in Steven C. Roach (ed.), Governance, Order, and the International Criminal 
Court. Between Realpolitik and a Cosmopolitan Court (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
6 Immanuel Kant, “To Perpetual Peace. A Philosophical Project”, trans. H. B. Nisbet, in HS. Reiss, (ed.) 
Kant’s Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), at pp.107-8. 
 6 
local problem was very much challenging the abuses of power occurring inside and outside 
borders. Even more important is the explanation provided by Kant: violations of rights are felt 
everywhere not because humans are creatures of the same God or because they belong to the 
same race. Kant does not provide a metaphysical justification, but rather a social justification. 
The fact that “the peoples have entered into a universal community” – what today we would call 
“globalization” – makes it no longer possible to depict individual communities as independent. 
Here lies the important difference between, on the one hand, Kant’s cosmopolitan law and, 
on the other hand, the much older natural law tradition. For the natural law tradition, rights exist 
as long as humans exist. Under cosmopolitan law, rights violations are perceived everywhere 
because of human interconnections. In other words, they are associated to a specific historical 
context. 
Kant does not explain how violations of rights should be addressed. He does not mention 
justice, let alone punishment. But, at least, he indicates that it is conceivable to build a new 
branch of law, what he baptizes “cosmopolitan law”7, separate from public law and international 
law. While public law is internal to a state, and international law governs the relationship among 
states, cosmopolitan law does not originate from states, much as states, as well as individuals, 
should respect its prescriptions. Kant does not say who should establish such a cosmopolitan 
law, nor who should enforce it. But, at least, he believes that a further, independent branch of 
law should be created and that such branch should not be constrained by inter-state relations. 
And perhaps he is also suggesting that such a cosmopolitan law, although powerless, is 
nevertheless legitimate. 
Kant wrote Perpetual Peace a few years after the National Assembly in Paris approved the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen. The Declaration had an important ambiguity: it 
was approved by a national assembly, but it was not clear if the rights it proclaimed were 
exclusively those of French citizens or also those of humanity at large. Perhaps Kant tried to 
generalize what the National Assembly did, giving to it a more general meaning. A sort of 
Cosmopolitan Assembly could have served to provide adequate legitimacy to such a 
cosmopolitan law. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the several covenants it generated 
can be seen as a further development of Kantian cosmopolitan aspirations. First of all, because 
the UDHR provides a list of rights, something that was still lacking in Kant. Secondly, because 
the UDHR has been formally approved by the governments of all countries; states themselves 
have been willing to concede that there are universal rights above them. We may discuss if this 
list is too broad or too narrow, we may complain that the Declaration does not provide 
guidelines for implementation, we may argue that there is no punishment associated to the 
                                                            
7 I have addressed these issues in D. Archibugi, “Kant, Cosmopolitan Law and Peace”, European Journal 
of International Relations, vol. 1, no. 4, 1995, pp. 429-456. For an historical account, see G.W. Brown, 
“Kantian Cosmopolitan Law and the Idea of a Cosmopolitan Constitution”, History of Political Thought, 
vol. 27, no. 4, 2006, pp. 661-684. 
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violation of these principles. But, at least, we have a list subscribed by all UN member 
countries: the violation of rights is no longer a state problem only. 
2) Human rights violations should be globally accountable 
Much progress has been made to better identify human rights violations and how they can 
also be protected through the involvement of agents outside the state8. External governments, 
international organizations and non-governmental organizations can now contribute to the 
assessment of national human rights regimes. Human rights rankings are becoming a very 
popular exercise and the press and media devote a lot of attention to them. 
The widespread human rights machinery developed since the second half of the XX century 
allows international organizations to carry out investigations, to identify culprits and to demand 
that member states put in place appropriate remedies. Violations of human rights are not only 
felt everywhere, but can also be condemned through legal devices. In a planet divided into 
sovereign states, the fastest and most effective way to implement remedies for human rights 
violations is to act through those who exercise control over territories, namely governments. If 
rights are violated, the inter-governmental human rights machinery may require individual 
governments to recognize the problem, work to sort it out and punish the culprits.  
But, as the long history of the former UN Human Rights Commission and now Human 
Rights Council (HRC) shows, the real problem is how to protect human rights when the 
perpetuators of abuses are the governments themselves. The procedures of the HRC and of the 
various international organizations are slow and ineffective. Since they exercise power, 
governments and their officers have mostly been immune from the consequences. The fact that 
those responsible for crimes are government agents has made the human rights regime 
dependent upon diplomatic negotiations, with the consequence that too often investigations 
have been inconclusive and procedures have not led to clear indications. International 
organizations cannot inflict individual punishment and collective punishment, such as sanctions, 
is not effective. Is the cosmopolitan principle still useful if there are no direct consequences on 
perpetrators? The principle of global human rights violations accountability has been 
established but it has not yet been implemented. 
3) A government agent is individually responsible for his/her actions 
The Tribunals of Nuremberg and Tokyo have wiped out two old dogmas of international law 
by stating that: 
i) An agent that acts on behalf of its state is not immune from responsibility.  
ii) Obeying governments’ orders does not exonerate individual responsibility.  
Much has been written about the legitimacy of the claims made in the hearings of 
Nuremberg and Tokyo, but lawyers have done their best to restate and refine the principles used 
in these celebrated trials: when in 1949, the UN International Law Commission approved the 
                                                            
8 This is, for example, at the core of Richard Falk, Human Rights Horizons. The Pursuit of Justice in a 
Globalized World (London: Routledge, 2001). 
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Nuremberg Principles it clearly listed a limited number of crimes under international laws. The 
Nuremberg Principles have been often used not only in theory, but also in courts. Over the last 
decades, the defence strategy of suspects for international crimes has frequently changed: 
individuals at the bar have less and less defended themselves claiming individual immunity 
because they were acting on behalf of their government or because they were executing orders. 
When these arguments have been used in Courts, they have proved progressively less effective 
and eventually counter-productive. 
The generalization of the Nuremberg Principles includes an important cosmopolitan 
principle: state norms are no longer the supreme source of legitimacy to guide individual 
behaviour9. Of course, this does not apply to all norms, but only to the limited subset that the 
Nuremberg Principles defined as crimes under international law. The fact that individuals 
should respect not only the rules of the state, but also the rules of the international community is 
an important breach of state sovereignty. The occurrence that, when there is a conflict among 
the two the latter should prevail, is a powerful cosmopolitan value. The individual’s loyalty 
towards his/her political community has precise limits recognized by international law. 
4) Punishment for crimes should be individual and not collective 
The principle that crime and associated punishment is individual and not collective is largely 
shared within political communities: in any legitimate society, nobody is criminally responsible 
for crimes committed by others. This principle, however, is not automatically extended to the 
international sphere.  
The ius gentium tradition assumes that when a government commits an international crime, 
all the community could bear the responsibilities. A late student of the law of nations tradition, 
Adam Smith, clearly articulates this position: 
If the government commits any offence against a neighbouring sovereign or subject, and its 
own people continue to support and protect it, as it were, in it, they thereby become accessory 
and liable to punishment along with ‘it’. As by the Roman law, if any of these slaves which 
every private person kept for his own advantage had done any damage to another, one of these 
two things was to be done, he must either keep the slave no longer, or pay the damage. In like 
manner a nation must either allow itself to be liable for the damages, or give up the government 
altogether.10 
According to this tradition, there is a direct connection between the ruler and the ruled. It is 
implicitly assumed that the ruled have the possibility to get rid of the ruler that commits crimes 
and if the ruled are not willing or not able to do so, they should bear the consequences. The ius 
gentium is contradictory since, in many versions, it denies the people’s right to resist their 
                                                            
9 For an assessment, see Vesselin Popovski, “Legalitty and Legitimacy of International Criminal 
Tribunals”, in Richard Falk, Mark Juergensmeyer and Vesselin Popovski (eds.), Legality and Legitimacy 
in Global Affairs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
10 Adam Smith, “The Law of Nations”, in Adam Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence (1766), edited by R.L. 
Meek, D.D. Raphael and P.G. Stein (Glasgow Edition) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978). 
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ruler.11 Whether or not the people are legally authorized to revolution, there is the basic notion 
of the total identity between the responsibilities of the governors and those of the governed. 
Cosmopolitans have an opposite view. Even when crimes are committed by the head of 
government, this does not necessarily mean that the whole community is responsible. The 
Nuremberg Principles have already ascertained that, as a cosmopolitan duty, a government agent 
is individually responsible including when representing a state or obeying orders. But it should 
also be affirmed a specular cosmopolitan right, namely that a political community should not be 
punished for the crimes of its ruler. 
Individual responsibility and the lack of collective responsibility should be seen as a 
duty/right pair. Identifying the duties of the individuals also helps to affirm the individual right 
to protection from retaliations. There is a reason why cosmopolitans hold this view: 
cosmopolitans believe that the “social contract” between the ruler and the ruled – which is the 
theoretical assumption behind Adam Smith’s position – is an unbearable fiction. Why should it 
be assumed that an implicit social contract exists within a state? If any such contract exists, it is 
intellectually and, above all, politically more robust to conceptualize it at the global rather than 
at the state level. 
Realists will also argue that it is very difficult to hold individually responsible those in the 
government. If punishment for an international crime should be inflicted, it is easier to impose it 
collectively rather than individually. Again, Adam Smith makes this position clear. 
Another cause is that it is often very difficult to get satisfaction from a subject or from a 
sovereign that may have offended. They are generally in the heart of the country and perfectly 
secured. If we could get at them, no doubt they would be the first to objects of our resentment, 
but as this is impossible we must make reprisals some other ways. We have suffered unjustly on 
account of our connections, let them also suffer unjustly on account of theirs. In war there must 
always be the greatest injustice but it is inevitable. 
The cosmopolitan position is, again, different. It holds that reprisals amount to the “greatest 
injustice” against peoples who are not the perpetrators. These forms of punishment should be 
avoided and alternative forms of punishment should be pursued. Out of an emergency, 
cosmopolitans share the libertarian position of the presumption of innocence expressed by 
William Blackstone and his followers: “The law holds it better that ten guilty persons escape, 
than that one innocent party suffer”12. Cosmopolitans believe that the presumption of innocence, 
so well-developed within liberal states, should also hold across nations, and especially when 
supposed collective responsibilities are at stake. Otherwise, both in war and in peace, the use of 
force does not administer justice but retaliation. For this reason, individual responsibility is also 
needed to prosecute, when needed, those “sovereigns perfectly secured”. 
                                                            
11 For an analysis of the various versions of the ius gentium on the right to resistance, see Daniele 
Archibugi, Mariano Croce and Andrea Salvatore, “Law of Nations or Perpetual Peace? Two Early 
International Theories on the Use of Force”, in Marc Weller (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Use of 
Force in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
12 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (London: Cavendish, 2001). 
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5) Judicial institutions can constrain and moderate the use of power 
Power needs to be tamed and the greater the number of the players to monitor power, the less 
likely that it will be abused. Independent judicial institutions are instrumental in minimizing the 
abuses of the executive power. The idea that the judicial power and, more generally, the legal 
construction, could contribute to the taming of power has always been controversial. 
Thrasymachus believed that “justice is nothing but the advantage of the stronger”13, and 
contemporary realists such as Danilo Zolo share the same view14. Constructivists hold the 
opposite view. Luigi Ferrajoli, for example, has argued that strong players do not need the 
infrastructure of law to get their power affirmed and therefore, even when legal rules are 
generated by the strongest, they ultimately turn out to be beneficial to the weaker15. 
Can the same principle be extrapolated and applied to international politics? To what extent 
would a global judicial power defend the interests of strong and weak players? Pure realists 
assume that the judicial power ultimately responds to the interests of the strongest players since 
those with more resources are able to better shape ideology and norms. The argument was 
repeated again and again by commentators of the Tribunals of Nuremberg and Tokyo, and it has 
been used again with reference to the special Tribunals for the ex-Yugoslavia and Rwanda. 
A cosmopolitan thinker does not necessarily ignore the realists’ arguments, especially if they 
are meant to interpret the state of things. But a cosmopolitan might also note that, once a new 
practice of law is established, this is less likely to respond to the interests of the strong. Or, to be 
more precise, the judicial infrastructure becomes contestable and all parties, strong and weak, 
may try to use it to their advantage. Norms and institutions are difficult to introduce but once 
they are in place, they are rather persistent. Laws and courts, once established, have their own 
life and can evolve along very different lines than those for which they were created. The 
principles of Nuremberg, for example, were strongly supported by the United States and their 
allies in the late 1940s. They were established to affirm that the WWII winners were not only 
militarily but also morally superior to the losers. But many of the principles were later used 
against the United States and the Soviet Union and helped to constrain their abuses of power. 
Richard Falk has often denounced the way in which courts have bowed to political authority but 
he has nevertheless expressed a faith in the capability of laws and norms to offset executive 
power. 
6) The players of a global justice should not be governments alone 
Much of the legal construction of post-WWII is based on inter-governmental consensus. But 
judicial institutions partially betray this spirit. Although governments voluntarily decide when 
and how to be party to international judicial institutions, once Courts are instituted, they are 
based on the fundamental principle of the independence of the judicial power. Judges of the 
                                                            
13 Plato, The Republic, book I. 
14 D. Zolo, Victors’ Justice: From Nuremberg to Baghdad (New York: Verso Books, 2009). 
15 Luigi Ferrajoli, Dei diritti e delle garanzie (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2013). 
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International Court of Justice (ICJ) and of the International Criminal Court (ICC), although 
nominated after cunning diplomatic negotiations, are requested to proceed according to their 
beliefs and not according to the interests of their state. Controversies could therefore be 
addressed not only through executive bodies such as the Security Council, but also in 
compliance with a genuine interpretation of international law. And crimes under international 
law could also be persecuted by independent judicial institutions. 
Of course, the ICJ and the ICC are not sufficiently independent from the executive power. 
The fact that judges are nominated by member states makes it difficult to preserve their 
independence. We know too well, for example, that judges of the ICJ seldom move away from 
what they perceive to be in the interest of their nation16. The story of the ICC is still too young 
to be assessed but it may sadly lead to similar results. 
At the moment, there are not viable alternatives to guarantee the independence of judicial 
institutions. In a pure cosmopolitan spirit, the judicial role of the ICJ and of the ICC could be 
reinforced if judges were designated by institutions independent from states. Alternative 
institutions, such as a World Parliamentary Assembly, are a long way off from being 
instituted17. But, again, it should not be ignored that, with their very existence, formally 
independent international judicial institutions have started to erode the monocratic role of 
governments in international politics.  
Table 1 recaps the arguments of the six cosmopolitan principles. 
                                                            
16 See the statistical analysis of Eric A. Posner and Miguel F.P. de Figueiredo, “Is the International Court 
of Justice Biased”, Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 34, no. 2 (2005): 599-629. 
17 Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss have bravely and repeatedly advocated the creation of a World 
People’s Parliament. See their papers in Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss, A Global Parliament: Essays 
and Articles (New York: Committee for a Democratic U.N., 2011). I have argued that such a Parliament 
would be the ultimate source of legitimacy for global judicial institutions. See Archibugi, The Global 
Commonwealth of Citizens, cit., pp. 165-171. 
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Table  1  –  Accomplishments  and  problems  of  cosmopolitan  criminal  accountability  and 
punishment 
 Cosmopolitan principles 
Accomplishments Problems 
1 Violations of rights in one part of the earth 
are felt everywhere 
Through the UN UDHR and 
subsequent Covenants, there is 
international consensus on what 
human rights violations are 
The international human rights machinery 
is highly ineffective in identifying 
individual and governmental 
responsibilities. Rights are felt everywhere, 
but very little is being done to defend them 
2 Human rights violations should be 
globally accountable 
Through the Principles of 
Nuremberg, there is an agreement 
on a selected list of international 
crimes that can be prosecuted by 
remote national courts and by 
international tribunals 
The universal jurisdiction by national courts 
is ineffective. The administration of 
international criminal justice is still highly 
selective and biased. Not all states have 
adhered to the ICC. Aggression, the crime 
that it is most likely to concern powerful 
governments, is still without a definition 
3 A government agent is individually 
responsible for his/her 
actions 
The principle has been largely 
accepted by both national and 
international Courts 
Government agents of powerful states have 
de facto benefitted from immunity for the 
international crimes they have committed 
since political arguments have prevailed 
4 Punishment for crimes is individual and not 
collective 
The principle is accepted and 
there is an increasing effort to 
exclude civilians in case of war 
Wars continue to be fought even when they 
jeopardize the innocent. The so-called 
“humanitarian interventions” have 
produced a large number of victims among 
the innocent 
5 Judicial institutions can constrain and 
moderate the use of 
power 
Judicial institutions are formally 
based on impartiality 
So far, judicial institutions have targeted the 
weak and the losers rather than the strong 
and the winners 
6 The players of a global justice should not be 
governments alone 
International judges of the ICJ, 
ICC and ad hoc tribunals should 
act independently 
International judges are nominated by 
assemblies of member states and are de 
facto controlled by governments 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
From discomfort to new hopes 
If we look at the six principles of cosmopolitan justice identified above, some steps forward 
have been taken. We are far from reaching the supremacy of the legal construction already 
recommended by Hans Kelsen18, but in the nearly 70 years since the end of WWII many steps 
have been taken in the direction of a cosmopolitan judicial power. Progress has been achieved in 
each of the areas, even if in none of them this progress is definite. Column 2 of Table 1 tries to 
synthesize these achievements. 
While slowly evolving, this legal construction had also to meet new historical conditions. In 
the same period, there have been new areas of modern warfare that have not been properly 
addressed legally and that would require a much more robust cosmopolitan enforcement. 
Nuclear weapons and their proliferation have obviously an impact on all the citizens of the 
world and would require a proper cosmopolitan monitoring. But they are still treated as an issue 
of national security and none of the most important members of the nuclear club is disposed to 
accept any form of external control. 
                                                            
18 Hans Kelsen, Peace through Law (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944). 
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Since the end of the WWII, aerial bombing has frequently been used. It has been neither 
condemned nor banned from international judicial institutions for its inability to distinguish 
between combatants and non-combatants, crime perpetrators and victims. It is true that over the 
last decade they have become more precise and the risk of provoking what has been labelled 
“collateral damages” has decreased. But not even the impressive technological development 
achieved has satisfied the cosmopolitan principle of individual responsibility, since – as the 
interventions in Kosovo 1999, Iraq, 2003 and Libya 2011 show – the killing of civilians 
continues to be huge. If these military interventions are also motivated by the desire to protect 
individuals from international crimes perpetuated by the incumbent governments, they have 
fallen short of their humanitarian target. On the one hand, they have often generated more 
victims than those that they saved; on the other hand, seldom did they manage to punish 
individually the responsible of the original crimes. Moreover, warfare through aerial bombing 
has become a form of punishment that substitutes a judicial review. 
The procedure used to justify and ultimately carry out these so-called humanitarian 
interventions has nothing cosmopolitan about it. The use of force has been decided by states, it 
has been used as a bargaining chip in inter-state relations, and it has followed the individual 
power capacity of each state. When crimes are committed, strong states and their agents are 
immune from punishment, regardless of how serious their crimes are. 
Can international criminal justice help to rebalance the situation? International tribunals have 
become more frequent, and their cases have gained greater resonance. Two things emerge from 
the chronicle of the last twenty years. The first is that the judicial devices have multiplied. The 
activism of national courts under universal jurisdiction has substantially increased, ad hoc 
institutions have proliferated and the ICC has been active for more than a decade. Developments 
have been substantial and lawyers and international relations scholars have worked hard to 
provide typologies of the various tools. These combined developments justify talking about an 
emerging global justice. Table 2 reports some of the paradigmatic examples of the instruments, 
tribunals and accused. 
Despite the existence of different Courts, there is certain repetitiveness in the way that trials 
have operated. Both the claimants and the defendants have used similar arguments and the 
interest of public opinion and of the media, which (have been) initially are/were rather eager to 
follow, started to decline. The idea of an individual criminal responsibility flourished as one of 
the hopes generated by the end of the Cold War, and was very much nurtured by the hope that 
the most vicious dictators of the world could be held accountable for their crimes. A hope that is 
progressively vanishing. 
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Table 2 – Forms of the Emerging Criminal Justice 
Typology of the emerging global 
criminal justice 
Court Striking Accused 
National tribunals instituted after 
civil or International wars 
Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal Saddam Hussein 
National tribunals applying 
universal jurisdiction 
Belgian Courts empowered by a 
wide-ranging Law from 1993 to 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
Spanish Court 
Although the prosecution stopped 
in the preliminary stages, Ariel 
Sharon, Yasser Arafat, George 
H.W. Bush, Colin Powell and Dick 
Cheney, among others, were 
indicted. 
 
Augusto Pinochet 
Ad hoc International tribunals 
with limited geographical and 
temporal jurisdiction 
International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia and 
International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda 
Slobo Milosevic and Radovan 
Karadzic 
Ad hoc mix tribunals (in force 
thanks to agreements between 
National governments and 
International organizations) with 
limited geographical jurisdiction 
Special Court for Sierra Leone 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts 
of Cambodia 
Charles Taylor 
Kang Kek Iew 
Permanent international 
institutions 
International Criminal Court Omar Hasan Ahmad Al Bashir 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
The second, and perhaps decisive, fact is that the connection between the crimes committed 
and the trials continue to be incommensurable. The scale and atrocity of the international crimes 
committed do not find any adequate historical reconstruction and punishment in the icy court-
rooms. The mismatch between crimes and perpetrators at the bar was already noted by Hannah 
Arendt as one of the most striking elements of the trial of Eichmann19. Again and again, these 
trials have shown that the crimes committed can neither been punished nor forgotten20. 
It is sufficient to see how short the list of suspected and culprits at the bar is vis-à-vis the list 
of the victims to realize the enormous disproportion which exists. Crimes under international 
law have generated, only in the last twenty years, millions of victims. People at the bar are a few 
dozens. The disproportion between criminals and victims is very distressing, but this should not 
be used as an argument to sink the emerging global criminal justice. From its very origin, global 
criminal justice aimed to have a symbolic power. Is the basic message about the accountability 
of power reaching those who exercise command? 
What continues to be disturbing about the emerging criminal justice is not only that the 
suspects are very few, but that they appear to be all from one side. If we look at the rather few 
prosecutions at the ICC, people at the bar are among the losers and weak players of international 
politics and ultimately those averse to the political agenda of Western powers. This raises 
important concerns about at least one of the cosmopolitan principles, namely the need to use the 
judicial power as a guarantee for the weak rather than as an instrument in the hands of the 
strong. When legal devices allowed charging of potent political players, as happened when the 
                                                            
19 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem. A Report on the Banality of Evil (London: Penguin, 1963). 
20 Antoine Garapon, Des crimes qu’on ne peut ni punir ni pardonner (Paris: Editions Odile Jakob, 2002). 
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Belgian Parliament empowered national judges to act widely on universal jurisdiction, the 
Parliament soon had to remove the law and to reintroduce norms aligned to the standards of the 
other European countries21. The ICC, which should become the principal judicial tool, is 
working on cases from the African continent only. 
We have to again wonder: can the emerging global criminal justice become an additional 
check and balance against the actual distribution of power? Historical records, so far, indicate 
that it does not. Trials have mostly been a sanctification of the winners over the losers. No doubt 
those at the bar were active perpetrators of egregious crimes. No doubt these crimes deserved to 
be uncovered also through legal investigations. But, as Nuremberg and Tokyo evidently 
demonstrate, those at the bar were not only the criminals: they were also the losers. 
Towards cosmopolitan justice 
Cosmopolitans have good reasons to be happy about the emerging global criminal justice, 
but also some very good reasons to be worried about the shape it is taking. What appeared a 
great opportunity to control the indiscriminate use of violence, to limit state sovereignty, to 
increase the accountability of political leaders and, ultimately, to tame power is still having 
uncertain results. After twenty years, it seems that the development of global criminal justice 
corroborates Carl Schmitt’s thesis that the judicial infrastructure is a tool to assert the moral and 
not just the political and ultimately military superiority of the winners over the losers22. 
It is very unlikely that the existing architecture of the emerging global criminal justice will 
collapse. As it is often the case with international institutions, they may experience periods in 
which they are more active and others in which they are more sleepy. Unfortunately, there is not 
yet a connection between the activism of the ICC and of other courts and the international 
crimes committed: the global criminal justice is more likely to be influenced by international 
politics than by the scale and ferocity of crimes.  
It is, however, far too early to sink the original hopes that have inspired the dream of an 
impartial global criminal justice system. Its future developments are likely to be associated to 
contestation in which anti-hegemonic political players, from progressive governments to non-
governmental organizations, from concerned public opinion to opposition movements, will push 
                                                            
21 Malvina Halberstam, “Belgium's Universal Jurisdiction Law: Vindication of International Justice or 
Pursuit of Politics”; Cardozo Law Review, vol. 25, (2003-2004): 247-266. More generally on the 
Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction (Princeton: 2001, at 
https://lapa.princeton.edu/hosteddocs/unive_jur.pdf) made a valuable attempt to revitalize the notion. For 
the analysis of some paradigmatic cases, see Stephen Macedo (ed.), Universal Jurisdiction: National 
Courts and the Prosecution of Serious Crimes under International Law (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2006). 
22 The most direct articulation of Carl Schmitt’s position is the response he gave when he was jailed and 
interrogated by the Allied in Nuremberg in 1945-47. See Joseph W. Bendersky, “Carl Schmitt and 
Nuremberg”, Telos, Thursday, July 19, 2007, at http://www.telospress.com/carl-schmitt-and-nuremberg/. 
Telos has also published a fourth and last interrogation. For the complete text of the interrogations see, in 
Italian, Carl Schmitt, Risposte a Norimberga (Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2006). 
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the agenda in a genuine cosmopolitan direction23. In line with the hopes of legal pluralism, the 
proliferation of norms and institutions increase the possibilities of accountability, and also of 
powerful players24. What can be done? 
1) Towards the full implementation of the ICC 
The ICC should still be able to fulfil its promises. We are very far from obtaining the ICC 
that was envisaged at the beginning of the 1990s. The authority of the ICC will be measured 
against its capability to impeach not only defeated political players, but also the winning ones. If 
this does not happen, the ICC will remain a judicial instrument to further burden the losers and 
will hardly acquire its much needed aura of impartiality. 
The question remains if special and ad hoc tribunals will flourish in the next decade. A 
Kelsian vision about the unity of law would recommend integrating the activities carried out by 
national courts under the universal jurisdiction principle and those of ad hoc tribunals with those 
of the ICC. But legal pluralism, on the contrary, recommend preserving a variety of institutions 
and norms since this could allow to better tailor criminal justice to local contexts25. The real 
problem, however, is to make sure that there is a consistent body of laws to make sure that 
international crimes are clearly identified ex-ante and not ex-post. 
The ICC will become the core criminal juridical institution only inasmuch as it will increase 
its efficiency in terms of timing, effectiveness and costs. So far, most of its actions have been 
constrained by governments and also by a strong reluctance to commence proceedings that 
might be detrimental to powerful players. Realists would not be surprised. The impartiality of 
the Court is also seriously hampered by the fact that many states have not yet signed the Rome 
Statute. This generates the impression that the world is composed of two set of countries, those 
that are under its jurisdiction and those that are immune from it. 
There is an important area in which the competence of the Court is hampered: the crime of 
aggression. While the ICC is already operative for three of the four international crimes under 
its jurisdiction – genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity – the definition and the 
implementation of the fourth, aggression, has proven very controversial. Aggression is the 
typical crime that concerns powerful rather than weak players and, in the current international 
context, is the offense that may concern also the militarily dominant countries. Only the 2010 
Kampala Conference managed to produce a definition of “aggression”, giving competence to 
the Court to exercise its jurisdiction in 2017 only. What has already been envisaged in novels 
                                                            
23 See Richard Falk, “The Criminal Accountability of Leaders”, in Id., The Costs of War. International 
Law, the UN and World Order after Iraq (London: Routledge, 2008). 
24 See Mariano Croce, “All Law is Plural. Legal Pluralism and the Distinctiveness of Law”, Journal of 
Legal Pluralism, vol. 44, no. 65(2012): 1-33. 
25 See Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, “The Pluralism of International Criminal Law”, Indiana Law Journal, 
vol. 86(2011): 1063-1129. 
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and movies26 could hopefully become a reality. But ultimately state parties have been given the 
possibility to opt out, making an effective jurisdiction over the crime difficult, if not impossible, 
to achieve. Moreover, the ICC Prosecutor has to notify the Security Council, which in turn can 
delay the procedure27. 
It is perhaps in vain to envisage a judicial power fully autonomous from political power. 
Although a liberal constitution aims to guarantee the separation of powers and the independence 
of the judicial from the executive, this is seldom the case, even within consolidated 
democracies. Nobody knows how the activities of the ICC will evolve. Realist predictions doubt 
that it will ever become an institution able to balance power in international politics. 
Constructivists are more optimistic. Cosmopolitans do not need to align with either of these 
schools, since their aim is prescriptive rather than descriptive. But cosmopolitans would 
certainly argue that it is very unlikely that the ICC and other international organizations 
involved will become more active and impartial without due pressure exercised by non-
governmental organizations28.  
The ICC, as any other international tribunal, will always be under political constraints: the 
judges are nominated by member countries, and the budget is also provided by the latter. The 
only way to contrast the influence of national governments is to make the ICC accountable in 
the eyes of a vibrant and demanding public opinion29. Denouncements of human rights 
violations carried out by non-governmental organizations such as Amnesty International, 
investigations by inter-governmental organizations such as the Human Rights Council, will 
certainly pressure the ICC state parties and the ICC staff into being more daring. 
The role of NGOs has been crucial not only to establish the ICC30, but also to press for the 
achievement of a genuinely independent global criminal justice. Through the Coalition for the 
International Criminal Court (CICC)31, a large number of NGOs have federated their 
competences and are able to provide advice as well as criticism to the ICC and national 
governments. 
2) More active role of Opinion Tribunals 
                                                            
26 In Robert Harris’ The Ghostwriter, London, Hutchinson, 2007 (and the film with the same title directed 
by Roman Polanski, 2010) a former UK Prime Minister is prosecuted by the ICC for war crimes. 
27 For a discussion, see Matthew Gillett, “The Anatomy of an International Crime: Aggression at the 
International Criminal Court”, International Criminal Law Review, vol. 13, no. 4 (2013): 829-864. 
28 The argument is forcefully stressed by Marlies Glasius, “What is Global Justice and Who Decides? 
Civil Society and Victim Responses to the International Criminal Court’s First Investigations”, Human 
Rights Quarterly, vol. 31 (2009): 496-520. 
29 John Gastil, Colin J. Lingle and Eugene P. Deess, “Deliberation and Global Criminal Justice: Juries in 
the International Criminal Court”, Ethics and International Affairs, vol. 24, no. 1 (2010): 69-90, make an 
innovative proposal to increase the legitimacy and impartiality of ICC by using also popular juries. 
30 The role of NGOs in the generation of the ICC is well documented in Marlies Glasius, The 
International Criminal Court: A Global Civil Society Achievement (London: Routledge, 2006).  
31 CICC is a network of 2,500 civil society organizations active on human rights issues and provides 
updated and competent information on the activities carried out by the ICC. See http://www.iccnow.org/  
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The emergent global criminal justice should not be limited to what is allowed for by 
governments and inter-governmental organizations. It is equally important that the judicial 
rhetoric and devices are used by civil society. Opinion tribunals have already played a crucial 
role since they are affirming the principles that: i) crimes cannot be defined only by states and 
inter-state institutions; and ii) the right to judge (even if not to punish) is not a monopoly of 
governments. 
This important tradition, inaugurated by Bertrand Russell, Jean-Paul Sartre and Lelio Basso 
for war crimes in Vietnam in the 1960s, has played a fundamental role in using the judicial 
procedure to denounce some of the most important crimes of the last 50 years. The Permanent 
International Peoples Tribunal, hosted in Rome by the International Basso Foundation, has been 
one of the ventures particularly active in the issue32. Other ventures have been organized 
elsewhere. Particular influential in the last decade has been the World Tribunal on Iraq, that 
operated from 2003 to 2005, and which was opened by an insightful speech by Richard Falk33. 
In the long decades between the Nuremberg Principles and the early 1990s, opinion tribunals 
have been the most important initiatives to assess and denounce international crimes. The 
creation of the more official institutions over the last twenty years has not made opinion 
tribunals redundant. On the contrary, they are a crucial component and represent one important 
way according to which NGOs, human rights organizations and public opinion at large could 
investigate and condemn when the prosecution of international crimes is blocked by political 
constraints. 
Opinion tribunals can provide inputs to the ICC, sometimes producing evidence that the ICC 
itself has not been able or willing to collect. Although opinion tribunals can be partisan, they 
can act in a timely way and outside the straitjacket of inter-state relations. If they are promoted 
by authoritative and charismatic personalities, and if they uncover impartially important 
information, they can have an impact on public opinion that it is comparable and 
complementary to the more cautious international tribunals. 
3) Envisaging collective punishment as well as individual punishment 
The principle of individual, rather than collective, responsibility that cosmopolitans apply to 
global politics certainly has some limits. Hitler and the defendants at Nuremberg were certainly 
responsible for the atrocities of WWII, but they could have not carried out their crimes without 
a much wider collaboration from the German people. George W. Bush was re-elected in free 
                                                            
32 See Gianni Tognoni (ed.), Tribunale permanente dei popoli. Le sentenze (Verona: Bertani editore, 
1998). For a first narrative of international opinion tribunals, see Arthur Jay Klinghoffer and Judith Apter 
Klinghoffer, International Citizens’ Tribunals. Mobilizing Public Opinion to Advance Human Rights 
(Houdmills: Palgrave, 2001). 
33 Documents about the activities of this Opinion Tribunal are reported in Richard Falk, Irene Gendzier 
and Robert Jay Lifton (eds.), Crimes of War. Iraq (New York: Nation Books, 2006). See also his “World 
Tribunal on Iraq. Truth, Law and Justice”, in FalkThe Costs of War, cit. For a description and discussion, 
see Craig Borowiak, “The World Tribunal on Iraq: Citizens’ Tribunals and the Struggle for 
Accountability”, New Political Science, vol. 30, no. 2 (2008): 161-186. 
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and democratic elections less than two years after the invasion of Iraq. The principle of 
individual responsibility still applies, especially since previous forms of collective sanctions are 
not effective forms of punishment, but the fact that individuals should not be punished through 
violent methods does not necessarily mean that they are totally innocent. 
Can collective forms of punishment be envisaged to complement individual criminal 
responsibility? Collective responsibility should be addressed not in the form of retaliation, but 
rather as a form of awareness of a community to the consequences of its actions. US occupation 
troops in Germany at the end of WWII forced German citizens to visit nearby concentration 
camps. This was a remarkable case with the combination of awareness for the population, 
punishment for the key figures, but also reconstruction through the Marshall Plan. The Germans 
were the losers, and we have to wonder: is it possible to envisage similar forms of collective 
punishment through awareness for the winners too? 
Perhaps, democratic societies may accept that they should be aware of the consequences of 
their international actions even when they are the winners. Let’s imagine, for example, 
organizing special debates, broadcasted by the media, where the American and European public 
are informed of the effects of warfare on civil population in Vietnam, Kosovo, Iraq, Libya and 
elsewhere. Such a “punishment through awareness” could become an occasion for a global 
accountability not only of the leaders, but also of the peoples that, at least in democratic 
societies, have elected governments that commit international crimes. 
4) Combine individual punishment with reconciliation 
The magnitude of international crimes should also be compared with the number of peoples 
that are brought to justice. Take, for example, the genocide that occurred in Rwanda in 1994, 
when an estimate ranging from half a million to a million of people (were killed in just a few 
weeks. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda has managed, so far, to bring to justice 
95 individuals only, a number that represents only a very few of the criminals involved in the 
mass killing. 
To provide justice to the Tutsi community, an impressive number of Hutus should be put at 
the bar, trialled and jailed, in a scale that goes beyond the potential of criminal justice. When 
crimes are massive, punishment seems to be useless as well as impossible. An alternative is 
what the South Africa of Nelson Mandela tried to achieve after the end of apartheid in 1994: 
reconciliation34. Reconciliation is based on the idea that the coexistence of different 
communities needs to be based on truth and on the acceptance of common responsibilities. This 
                                                            
34 Particularly stimulating the anthropological perspective discussed by Richard Wilson, The Politics of 
Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Legitimizing the Post-Apartheid State (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011). For an analysis of several cases of reconciliation, see Naomi Roht-Ariazza and 
Javier Mariezcurrena (Eds.), Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First Century. Beyond Truth versus 
Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). See also Luc Huyse and Mark Salter (eds.), 
Justice traditionelle et reconciliation après un conflict violent. La richesse des experiences africaines 
(Stockholm: Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2009). 
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does not impede that some of the egregious culprits are subsequently also punished according to 
criminal law, but it allows involving a larger number of participants to the hostilities. 
Reconciliation is also a typical communitarian instrument: it is needed to re-build the trust and 
friendship that any community needs to survive and prosper. But in many occasions, the 
cosmopolitan external accountability could help to foster and facilitate reconciliation, especially 
when third parties could act as brokers and referees. 
Conclusions 
The last twenty years have marked an important milestone: international crimes can be 
persecuted even when they are committed by political leaders. This is happening for a very tiny 
number of criminals, but at least there is not any longer the certainty of impunity. 
Cosmopolitans can be satisfied that egregious crimes are no longer under the exclusive 
jurisdiction of national authorities. Criminal justice, a crucial component of state sovereignty, 
should face the checks and balances of international law, institutions and courts. So far this is 
only possible for international crimes but the theoretical implications are much wider: the legal 
construction could progressively lead to a global judicial framework. This is, indeed, an 
important change not only for our understanding of individual responsibility, but also of the 
dynamics of world politics. 
The hope that an emerging global criminal justice could contain violations committed by the 
agents of powerful states has, so far, not materialized. As predicted by realists, the emerging 
global criminal justice has rather reinforced rather than counterbalanced the current distribution 
of power. Powerful agents have managed to manipulate and to use criminal justice much better 
than the weak agents. However, constructivists may be right in arguing that there is no certainty 
that this situation will perpetuate in the future. The seeds of the global criminal justice can 
bloom in unexpected directions. 
In this chapter I have indicated that a progressive development of the emerging global 
criminal justice is not only associated to what judges and ambassadors, governments and 
lawyers will do. It is also associated to the role that the global civil society will be able to play. I 
have indicated four actions that should be taken in order to make the emerging global criminal 
justice align with cosmopolitan aspirations.  
First, the ICC is likely to be effective in its aims only if it manages to integrate the rather few 
trials with an ample debate that involves NGOs. Trials at the ICC are helpful if they are 
amplified by local ventures and aim to reconciliate society. I have also noted that if the crime of 
aggression is not properly defined, the ICC will continue to be an instrument in the hands of the 
powerful players over the weak players. Second, opinion tribunals should be reinvigorated by 
the existence of new Courts and their role should be more important today than in the past. 
Third, individual criminal responsibility should also be combined with forms of collective 
awareness about the crimes committed. Fourth, criminal responsibility should also be combined 
with a strategy of reconciliation, which could be fostered and facilitated by external third 
parties. 
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The cosmopolitan hope of an independent and impartial criminal justice system continues to 
be a dream. But the remarkable changes of the last twenty years have clearly shown that there is 
no progress without dreams. And that, as Richard Falk has shown us for several decades, 
dreams come true when there are agents willing to fight for them. 
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